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Blindsight denotes unconscious residual visual capacities in the context of an
inability to consciously recollect or identify visual information. It has been described
for color and shape discrimination, movement or facial emotion recognition. The
present study investigates a patient suffering from cortical blindness whilst maintaining
select residual abilities in face detection. Our patient presented the capacity
to distinguish between jumbled/normal faces, known/unknown faces or famous
people’s categories although he failed to explicitly recognize or describe them.
Conversely, performance was at chance level when asked to categorize non-facial
stimuli. Our results provide clinical evidence for the notion that some aspects of
facial processing can occur without perceptual awareness, possibly using direct
tracts from the thalamus to associative visual cortex, bypassing the primary visual
cortex.
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Introduction
Patients with damage to the geniculocalcarine visual pathways may present cortical blindness.
Some of them demonstrate the capacity to correctly ‘‘guess’’ visual characteristics during forced
choice task, reflecting unconscious visual perception. This residual visual ability without perceptual
awareness is termed ‘‘blindsight’’ (Sanders et al., 1974; Weiskrantz et al., 1974; Stoerig and Cowey,
2007; Cowey, 2010) Visual pathways flowing directly from the retina to the superior colliculus (by
passing the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN)) or projections from the LGN to areas beyond striate
cortex have been suggested to mediate blindsight behavior (Lamme, 2006; Stoerig and Cowey,
1997; Goebel et al., 2001; Tong, 2003; Stoerig and Cowey, 2007).
Various residual visual skills have been reported such as, detection of direction of movement
(Sahraie et al., 1998), discrimination of simple shapes (Weiskrantz, 1986) or colors (Brent et al.,
1994). More recently, cases of ‘‘affective blindsight’’ have been described. These patients have
maintained the ability to discriminate between different facial emotions (de Gelder et al., 1999;
Hamm et al., 2003).
Unconscious processing of other facial features have been described in several studies. For
instance, patients who fail to recognize any face (i.e., prosopagnosia) may have different skin
conductance in response to known vs. unknown faces (Bauer, 1984; Tranel and Damasio, 1985).
Similarly, studies in healthy subject using visual masking to prevent stimulus awareness have
revealed nonconscious recognition of facial identity at the behavioral (Stone and Valentine, 2004)
and electrophysiological level (Henson et al., 2008).
Here we describe the first patient with cortical blindness presenting some
advanced facial processing abilities, beyond simple processing of facial emotions.
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Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the institutional ethical committees
of Geneva and conducted according to principles outlined by the
Declaration of Helsinki. The patient received an explanation of
the research protocol and gave written informed consent.
Patient Report
A.M. was a 67 years old right-handed man, with a medical
history of cardiac arrhythmia that had required pacemaker
implantation. He was admitted to the hospital for an elective
Cryo-Maze-Procedure to treat new atrial fibrillation. The surgical
intervention was complicated by perioperative ischemic stroke
of the right parieto-occipital and of the left temporo-occipital
cortices with secondary bilateral hemorrhagic transformation
(Figure 1).
Clinically, A.M. presented Anton’s syndrome (Anton, 1899):
he was totally blind but denied any visual deficit. He failed to
detect a hand, hand movements, or a light source in any part
of his visual field. When asked about what he saw, he described
an imaginary environment, integrating elements perceived by
other sensory modalities. For instance, he described a person
that he heard and imagined that the person wore red clothes
and a green hat. Over the following weeks, visual impairment
improved slightly but remained extremely severe. At the time
of the present investigation, between weeks 8 and 10 after the
stroke, A.M. was still essentially blind and would only detect a
strong light source in the left hemifield when the flashlight was
directly pointing in his eyes; he would not detect it in other parts
of the visual field or when it was not directly pointing in his eyes.
However, he remained clinically blind (visual acuity < 20/200
tested with the Snellen Eye Chart) and failed to name, recognize
or detect any object, color or movement. For example, when we
waved the hand just in front of his eyes, he didn’t detect any
change in the scene that he pretended to see and kept staring into
the far space. A formal test of the visual field was not possible
as the patient could not hold his gaze in one direction and the
presence of Anton’s syndrome led to unreliable reports from the
patient.
A surprising dissociation was observed between A.M’s
virtually complete absence of vision and his behavior in certain
life situations. For instance, he apparently was able to maintain
eye contact with his examiners, and seemed to be familiar with
some of his therapists on sight alone even though he could not
name them. To assess this clinical impression we performed the
following behavioral visual tests.
Visual Assessment
We tested visual functions using forced choice tasks in which
A.M. was instructed to identify the category of each image by
choosing between two or four options (see below for details).
Each test consisted of 20–24 images on white paper presented in
random order for five seconds in the central visual field. Portrait
images had approximately 17◦ horizontal and 22◦ vertical visual
angle and square images 20◦ visual angle. Each task was repeated
three times at different days resulting in a total of 60–72 items
per task. Each test contained an equal number of each category
leading to a chance level of 50% (two options task) or 25% (four
options task).
Shape perception was assessed with a task in which A.M.
had to guess the correct shape between black circles, squares,
triangles, or crosses (Figure 2A). In a second experiment, he
had to choose the drawing corresponding to a named category
(animal or object; Figure 2B).
Forassessment of face perception, A.M. had first to recognize
true faces in a set of jumbled or normal faces (Figure 2C).
In a second task, we presented photographs of famous actors,
politicians, sportsmen or unknown people and asked the patient
to guess which of these four categories each item belonged
to (Figure 2D). Then, he had to discriminate between known
and unknown faces when presented with photographs of
his therapists and therapists from other medical department
(Figure 2E). In a complementary experiment, we presented A.M.
with pictures of his own family and himself among unknown
people.
For assessment of emotion perception, we presented
photographs of fearful and neutral faces (Figure 2F; Ekman and
Friesen, 1976) and tested his ability to recognize the correct
emotion. In further sets, A.M. had to discriminate between fear
provoking and non-fear provoking pictures of shark/dolphins
(Figure 2G).
Statistical Analysis
Discriminability between stimuli was calculated using signal
detection theory (SDT; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005).
Statistical validity of the patient’s performance for each test
was established using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test and tested
against the null hypothesis of a performance equal to chance
levels. Analyses were performed with R (R Development Core
Team, 2013) including the ‘‘psyphy’’ package (Knoblauch, 2014).
Results
A.M. failed to distinguish shape (Figure 2A; d′ = −0.3, 17%
correct answers, chance level 25%, χ2(1) = 2.22, p = 0.13) and
drawings of objects and animals (Figure 2B; d′ = 0.4, 58% correct
answers, chance level 50%, χ2(1) = 1.67, p = 0.19).
In contrast, A.M. demonstrated remarkable residual capacity
in face perception. He correctly distinguished true faces from
jumbled faces (Figure 2C; d′ = 4.3, 82% correct answers, chance
level 50%, χ2(1) = 24.07, p < 0.0001), and correctly guessed
people’s category (Figure 2D; d′ = 1.7, 75% correct answers,
chance level 25%, χ2(1) = 80, p< 0.0001). Similarly, A.M. was able
to discriminate between his and other therapists (Figure 2E; d′
= 2.9, 93% correct answers, chance level 50%, χ2(1) = 49.47, p <
0.0001) and to distinguish fearful and neutral faces, (Figure 2F)
with high accuracy (d′ = 4.9, 91%, chance level 50%, χ2(1) = 47.08,
p < 0.0001). Conversely, his performance at detecting the
emotional content of pictures/photographs without human faces
(Figure 2G) was at chance level (d′ = 0.2, 53%: correct answers,
chance level 50%, χ2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.6). In conclusion, scores
in facial categorization tasks were significantly better than other
tasks (χ2(1) = 77.56, p < 0.0001), although A.M. was unable to
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FIGURE 1 | Axial CT scan performed 6 weeks after stroke reveals right parieto-occipital and left occipital lesions.
name or describe any of these faces and often misjudged their
gender.
When presented with photographs of his own family he had
strong feelings of familiarity although he failed to recognize
them. For example, when looking at a photograph of his wife,
he said: ‘‘he’s my best friend, he comes and visits me every day’’.
When presented with his own picture, he said: ‘‘It’s strange,
I know him really well, I meet him every day but I cannot tell
you who he is’’.
Discussion
Patient A.M. suffered from lesions of the left primary visual
cortex and the right optic tract leading to cortical blindness,
except for a strong light source in the left hemifield. He failed
to discriminate shapes and objects, thus showing no evidence of
blindsight as it has been traditionally described (Cowey, 2010).
Despite his apparent blindness, he maintained some remarkable
capacities for facial processing (Figure 3). He distinguished
between drawings of a correctly composed and a jumbled face
beyond chance. While he failed to recognize the identity of any
face, he was able to categorize a significant proportion of faces
as known or unknown, according to category, and regarding
the facial expression. We propose to call this disorder ‘‘facial
blindsight’’ as the patient often correctly guessed the category
of faces without any explicit knowledge about their identity.
As evident from Figure 2, these specific capacities cannot be
attributed to differences in the visual contrast of recognized vs.
non-recognized items. On the contrary, while faces generally
have a lower contrast when compared to basic polygons, A.M.
was still more capable of recognizing them.
Blindsight patients are usually unaware of the visual stimulus.
A.M. was unaware of the stimuli that were truly shown to him
although he would confabulate stimuli that were not present in
reality. His facial recognition abilities thus appear to be due to
unconscious processes whose result he could not explicitly report
or verbalize. For instance, when looking at his wife’s picture,
he pretended to recognize his best friend. We assume that this
FIGURE 2 | Visual assessment showed impaired abilities in (A) shape and (B) object discrimination. (C) In contrast, A.M. was able to distinguish between jumbled
and normal faces. (D) He was also able to distinguish between photographs of sportsmen, politicians, famous actors or unknown people and (E) to differentiate
“known/unknown” faces of therapists from his and other medical departments. (F) He was also able to discriminate between fearful and neutral faces but (G) not
when emotions were presented in other contexts.
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FIGURE 3 | Results of visual assessment. The results of all tasks involving faces were significantly above chance whereas those without faces were at chance
level. ∗p < 0.05.
confabulation was driven by some ‘‘feeling of knowing’’ but
also illustrates the absence of the perception of concrete facial
features.
Despite the fact that cases of Anton syndrome associated with
blindsight have been previously reported (Maddula et al., 2009;
Carota et al., 2013), alternative diagnosis explaining A.M. clinical
features could be considered. Some patients with severe visual
agnosia have been reported to have relatively spared abilities
in facial perception whereas shape perception was impaired
(Moscovitch et al., 1997; McMullen et al., 2000; Germine et al.,
2011). However, these patients had intact visual abilities on a
basic sensory level and could for instance detect handmovements
or count fingers (Moscovitch et al., 1997; McMullen et al., 2000;
Germine et al., 2011). As A.M. was clinically blind, he did not
fulfill the basic criteria of agnosia.
Even if other clinical condition cannot be formally excluded
given some limitations of the present case (concomitant Anton
syndrome and impossibility to perform visual field), clinical
and experimental evidence clearly supports the presence of
a blindsight phenomenon. The neural circuit responsible for
blindsight seems to involve a subcortical colliculo-pulvinar
pathway independent of the primary visual cortex (Schmid
et al., 2010). Observations in patients with affective blindsight
(Morris et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2004; Pegna et al., 2005)
have shown amygdala activation through a V1-independent
pathway. Our patient not only presented the ability to
distinguish facial emotions but also more general skills in
face perception, suggesting a more complete involvement of
the neural system for face perception, including mainly the
lateral fusiform gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus and the
inferior occipital Gyri (Haxby et al., 2000; Schmidt et al.,
2005).
In our patient, the right temporo-occipital junction with
the fusiform gyrus was intact. This area is critical for face
perception. Prosopagnosia, the inability to recognize the identity
of faces, is always due to right-sided or bilateral lesions of
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this area. Imaging studies on the recognition of facial identity
and general face pattern consistently showed activation of
the lateral fusiform gyrus (Haxby et al., 2000; Hoffman and
Haxby, 2000) with right hemisphere dominance (Kanwisher
et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Halgren et al., 1999;
Rossion et al., 2000). Moreover, studies in healthy subject have
demonstrated that faces can elicit specific activity in the right
lateral fusiform gyrus even when they are not consciously
perceived (Morris et al., 2007; Kouider et al., 2009). Hence,
we surmise that A.M. unconscious residual visual faculties are
due to activation of the right lateral fusiform gyrus through
direct tracts from thalamic nuclei bypassing the primary visual
cortex.
While various types of blindsight have been described, A.M.
is, to our knowledge, the first case of facial blindsight. This
case provides evidence that some aspects of face processing can
occur unconsciously and independently of the primary visual
cortex.
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